Lecture #2: IoT security risks and challenges

<u>Cristian Hesselman</u>, Elmer Lastdrager, <u>Ramin</u> <u>Yazdani</u>, and Etienne Khan

University of Twente | May 11, 2022







Today's agenda

- Admin
- Introduction to today's lecture
- Paper on Demystifying IoT Security
- Paper on the DNS in IoT
- Feedback



Admin



Interactive lectures

- Overall objective: enable you to learn from each other and further increase your understanding of the papers, contributes to preparing yourself for the oral exam
- Interactive format
 - Teachers summarize two papers per lecture
 - Multiple-choice and open questions (not graded) and discussion
 - We ask at least one of you to share their thoughts on each paper (main lesson learned, etc.)
 - Enables you to learn from each other, so mandatory to participate
- A 7th "re-sit" lecture in case you miss a lecture (optional for everybody else), same format



Experiment: interactive quizzes through wooclap



Multiple-choice questions: 30 seconds Open questions: 1 minute



Paper summaries

- You must have handed in your two summaries **before 7AM on the day of the lecture**
- Each summary can be at most 250 words, at most 1 single-sided A4 page
- You can add figures, and graphs from the paper or add your own if you like (e.g., concept maps)
- You can use the summaries during the oral exam
- Submit through CANVAS
- You <u>cannot</u> complete SSI without submitting 12 paper summaries!



Schedule

No.	Date	Contents
1	Apr 26	Course introduction Guest lecture #1: IoT and SPIN
2	May 11	Lecture: IoT security risks and challenges
3	May 18	Lecture: IoT Botnet Measurements
4	May 24	Guest lecture #2: Intro to cyber-physical systems (Jeroen Gaiser, Rijkswaterstaat)
5	May 25	Lecture: IoT Malware Analysis
6	Jun 1	Lecture: IoT Edge Security Systems
7	Jun 7	Lecture: IoT Device Security
8	Jun 14	Guest lecture #3: Strengthening the IoT Ecosystem: Privacy Preserving IoT Security Management (Dr Anna Maria Mandalari, Imperial College London)
9	Jun 15	Lecture: IoT in Non-Carpeted Areas
10	Jun 22	Lecture: IoT Honeypots (re-sit)



Important dates

- Two summaries per lecture: before the lecture (07:00 CEST) in which the papers will be discussed
- Lab report (PDF) and required files: Sun June 26, 2022, 23:59 CEST
- All to be submitted through CANVAS



Introduction to today's lecture



Motivation: impact of insecure IoT devices

[Mirai] [SPIN]





https://stats.sidnlabs.nl/en/secu rity.html#mirai%20scans А Sense Sleep Monitor * = Went to bed 54000 = Temporarily User out of bed 49500 ** = Out of bed 45000 in morning 40500 36000 31500 22:40:00 00:20:00 02:00:00 03:40:00 05:20:00 07:00:00 08:40:00 10:20:00



[Castle] [SPIN]

Today's papers

[IoTSurvey] N. Neshenko, E. Bou-Harb, J. Crichigno, G. Kaddoum and N. Ghani, "Demystifying IoT Security: An Exhaustive Survey on IoT Vulnerabilities and a First Empirical Look on Internet-Scale IoT Exploitations," IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 21, no. 3, 2019

[DNSIoT] C. Hesselman, M. Kaeo, L. Chapin, kc claffy, M. Seiden, D. McPherson, D. Piscitello, A. McConachie, T. April, J. Latour, and R. Rasmussen, "The DNS in IoT: Opportunities, Risks, and Challenges", IEEE Internet Computing, Vol. 24, No. 4, July-Aug 2020



Today's learning objective

- After the lecture, you will be able to discuss different types of IoT security risks (vulnerabilities, attacks) and defense mechanisms to mitigate these risks
- Not very technical, but important to "set the scene" for more technical papers later in the course (we'll point you to them)
- Contributes to SSI learning goal #1: "Understand IoT concepts and applications, security threats, technical solutions, and a few relevant standardization efforts in the IETF"



"Demystifying IoT Security: An Exhaustive Survey on IoT Vulnerabilities and a First Empirical Look on Internet-scale IoT Exploitations" IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 2019



Security in IoT vs IT

• IoT applications require a stricter security due to potential to cause injury and drastic accidents leading to fatalities.

The Infamous Jeep Hack



https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/

Florida Water Plant Hack



https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2021/02/15/florida-water-plant-hackers-exploited-old-software-and-poor-password-habits/



Challenges

- Resource limitations make it challenging to satisfy security best practices.
- Heterogeneity of IoT software and communication protocols demands security solutions different than traditional IT.
- Stakeholders think that others are responsible to mitigate security risks (called security externality.
- Short time-to-market results in overlooking security.



. . .

Addressing Resource Limitation

Edge security systems:

- Commercial solutions: it is unclear whether their claims match security requirements
- Research solutions: not deployed and tested in large scale Lecture#6 [ARA, DBolt]





IoT Vulnerabilities

- Physical security issues
- Energy depletion Lecture #9 [Lora]
- Improper authentication, encryption and access control Lecture #3 [Mirai, Hajime], Lecture #7 [IoTLS]
- Unnecessary open ports Lecture #3 [Mirai, Hajime]
- Improper patch management Lecture #6 [DBolt]
- Software weaknesses Lecture #7 [IoTLS], Lecture #9 [Traffic]
- Insufficient auditing and logging Lecture #2 [DNSIoT]









Taxonomy of IoT Security

- Layers
- Security Impact
- Attacks
- Countermeasures
- Situational Awareness Capabilities



Layers: Where are the Vulnerabilities?

- Device-based
- Network-based Lecture #9 [Lora]
- Software-based Lecture #3 [Mirai, Hajime], Lecture #9 [Traffic]



IoT Malware







Mēris

- Vulnerability in RouterOS used in MikroTik routers
- "MikroTik RouterOS through 6.42 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read arbitrary files and remote authenticated attackers to write arbitrary files due to a directory traversal vulnerability in the WinBox interface." [CVE-2018-14847]
- Patched in 2018 but many routers still use old versions or default credentials.





Mēris

- HTTP pipelining: Browsers usually don't use it, but **Bots** do so!!!
- Request flood (not volumetric)
- Routers are computationally and connectivity wise stronger than IoT devices
- Attacked Yandex using~56K attacking hosts



Source: Wikipedia

More details on: https://blog.grator.net/en/meris-botnet-climbing-to-the-record_142/



Mēris



DDoS attack on Yandex, September 5, 2021

More details on: https://blog.qrator.net/en/meris-botnet-climbing-to-the-record_142/



Security Impacts and Attacks

- Confidentiality: side channel attacks
- Integrity: firmware modification, BrickerBot (corrupting storage)
- Availability: DDoS (Mirai, Cold Finland), Permanent DoS (device capture)
- Accountability Lecture #2 [DNSIoT], Lecture #3 [Mirai]

Other examples?





Cold Finland

- DDoS attacks knock down systems controlling heating during winter in the city of Lappeenranta in eastern Finland.
- Denied admins to remote access the system.
- Affected devices were detached from the Internet till traffic was filtered out by an upstream provider.



Source: http://metropolitan.fi/entry/ddos-attack-haltsheating-in-finland-amidst-winter



Countermeasures

- Access and Authentication Controls Lecture#6 [ARA, DBolt]
- Software assurance
- Security protocols Lecture #7 [IoTLS]



Situational Awareness

Vulnerability assessment

 \circ Designing IoT test beds is not straightforward (e.g., they need human interaction)*

 \circ Delays in the code execution of medical devices are fatal

- Honeypots re-sit lecture [IoTPoT, Honware]
- Network discovery: Censys, Shodan, Shadowserver, etc.
- Intrusion detection Lecture#6 [ARA, DBolt]

*Additional reading: E. Leverett, R. Clayton, and R. Anderson, "Standardisation and Certification of the `Internet of Things'", 16th Annual Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS2017), USA, June 2017.





Empirical Evaluation

Darknet data fused with Shodan data



Top sectors hosting exploited IoT devices



Top ten manufacturers of exploited IoT devices



Key Takeaways

- IoT security impacts not only data, but also physical and human safety.
- Empirical studies play a big role in timely detection of IoT vulnerabilities.
- Patching IoT vulnerabilities is not always straightforward.



"The DNS in IoT: Opportunities, Risks, and Challenges" IEEE Internet Computing, July-Aug 2020



What is the IoT?

- Internet application that extends "network connectivity and computing capability to objects, devices, sensors, and items not ordinarily considered to be computers" [ISOC]
- Differences with "traditional" applications
 - IoT continually senses, interprets, acts upon physical world
 - Without user awareness or involvement (passive interaction)
 - 20-30B devices "in the background" of people's daily lives
 - Widely heterogeneous (hardware, OS, network connections)
 - Longer lifetimes (perhaps decades) and unattended operation
- Promises safer, smarter, more sustainable society, but **IoT security is a major challenge**





IoT deployments and the Domain Name System (DNS)





DNS high-level operation

M. Müller, "Making DNSSEC Future Proof", Ph.D. thesis, University of Twente, September 2021







DNS ecosystem





Source: https://www.podfeet.com/blog/which-dns-resolver-should-i-use/

www.wooclap.com/LELPZY UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE. What's the purpose of DNS caches? 1 1 0 🛔 Lower DNS response times 0% 2 0 🛔 Increase DNS scalability 0% 3 Enable operators to analyze DNS queries 0% 0 🛔 4) ncrease demand for computer memory 0% 0 🛔 00:29 Ċ. wooclap 6 Q. 100 W Q 0 / 2 : i 6.2 ۱BS 42 Quiz 2/6

Overview

Help meet IoT's new safety and transparency requirements

Opportunities

- O1 Using DoH/DoT to encrypt DNS queries
- O2 Using DNSSEC to detect malicious redirects of IoT devices
- O3 DNS protocols to double-check the authenticity of IoT services
- O4 Protecting IoT devices against domain registration hijacks

Protect the SSR of the DNS against insecure IoT devices

O5 Using DNS datasets to increase IoT transparency

Risks

- R1 DNS unfriendly programming at IoT scale
- R2 Increased size and complexity of IoT botnets targeting the DNS
- R3 Increased DDoS amplification through open DNS resolvers

Technologies and systems that need to be developed

Challenges

- C1 Developing a DNS security and transparency library for IoT devices
- C2 Training IoT and DNS professionals
- C3 Developing a system to share information on IoT botnets
- C4 Proactive and flexible mitigation of IoT-powered DDoS traffic
- C5 Developing a system to measure how the IoT uses the DNS



O1: DNS-over-HTTPS (or another secure transport)



DoH reduces risk of IoT users being profiled

- Profiling based on the DNS queries that a user's IoT devices send
- Protects privacy: more difficult to figure out what devices people are using
- Protects safety: more difficult to figure out which devices are vulnerable
- Downside: risks in centralized resolver settings (e.g., Google Public DNS, Cloudflare)

N. Apthorpe, D. Reisman, N. Feamster, "A Smart Home is No Castle: Privacy Vulnerabilities of Encrypted IoT Traffic", Workshop on Data and Algorithmic Transparency (DAT '16), New York University Law School, November 2016

Device	DNS Queries
Sense Skep Monitor	hells-mudic.m3.mmagodaww.com
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	messeji.ballo.is
	atp bello is
	sense-in.hello.is
	time bells to
Nest Socurity Camera	nemes.dropcan.com
	eculus519-wir.drupcam.com
AC 22221210 (2023)	peed.orp.org
WeMo Switch	prod1-fs-xbcs-met+1101221371.
	us-east-1.elb.asazonavs.com
	prodl-api-sbcs-swt-889336567.
100000000000000000000000000000000000000	ns-east-1.elb.anaconave.com
Ansazon Echo	ash2-accesspoint-a92.ap.spotify.com
	audio-ac.spetify.com
	device-metrics-us.massos.com
	n'ip. anazon. con
	pinderama amazon.com
	softwareupdates.amazes.com

Figure 1: DNS queries made by tested IoT devices during a representative packet capture. Many queries can be easily mapped to a specific device or manufacturer.



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With DoH it's impossible for an on-path adversary to identify the service your IoT device is connecting to



O2: Signing DNS responses with DNSSEC



Source: https://www.netmeister.org/blog/doh-dot-dnssec.html

DNSSEC reduces risk of IoT device being redirected

- Unauthorized redirects through manipulation of DNS responses
- DNSSEC reduces privacy risk: sharing intimate sensor data with rogue service
- DNSSEC reduces safety risk: lowers probability of IoT device receiving malicious instructions (cf. air purifier)
- Most secure setup: signature validation on IoT devices



O3: DNS queries



spin.sidnlabs.nl | github.com/sidn/spin

[IMC] J. Ren, D. J. Dubois, D. Choffnes, A. M. Mandalari, R. Kolcun, and H. Haddadi, "Information Exposure from Consumer IoT Devices: A Multidimensional, Network-Informed Measurement Approach", Internet Measurement Conference (IMC2019), Amsterdam, Netherlands, Oct 2019



Figure 2: Volume of network traffic between the US (left) and UK (right) labs to the top 7 destination regions (center), grouped by category (middle left and right). Most traffic terminates the US, even for the UK lab; many devices send traffic to countries outside of their testbed's privacy jurisdiction.



DNS query data to make the IoT more transparent

- Measure IoT device's DNS queries
- Requires intuitive visualization for users
- Also, what sensor data are devices sharing?
- Perhaps a topic for future regulation
- Part of larger discussion on data autonomy







R1: DNS-unfriendly programming at IoT scale

- TuneIn app example: 700 iPhones generating random queries www.<random-string>.com
- In the stone age (2012), but still: imagine millions of unsupported devices exhibiting that kind of behavior after a software update
- High-level APIs abstract DNS away from developers





R2: DDoS attacks by IoT botnets

- IoT botnets of 400-600K bots (Mirai, Hajime), may increase
- Higher propagation rates (e.g., +50K bots in 24 hours)
- Vulnerabilities difficult to fix, botnet infections unnoticed
- DDoS amplification: 23-25 million open resolvers (now around 3 million)







C1-C3: Challenges for the DNS and IoT industries

- Develop an open-source DNS security and transparency library for IoT devices
 - Such as DNSSEC validation, DoH/DoT support
 - User control over DNS security settings and services used
- Develop a system to proactively detect IoT botnets
 - Share DDoS "fingerprints", countermeasures, and other botnet characteristics across operators
 - Collaborative DDoS detection and learning
- Collaboratively handle IoT-powered DDoS attacks
 - DDoS mitigation broker to flexibly share mitigation capacity
 - Security systems in edge networks, such as home routers



Why collaborative?

- Collaborative incident analysis
- Example: Mirai IoT botnet
- 11 sources, 9 organizations/sites

Role	Data Source	Collection Site	Collection Period	Data Volume
Growth and size	Network telescope	Merit Network, Inc.	07/18/2016-02/28/2017	370B packets, avg. 269K IPs/min
Device composition	Active scanning	Censys	07/19/2016-02/28/2017	136 IPv4 scans, 5 protocols
Ownership & evolution	Telnet honeypots Telnet honeypots Malware repository DNS—active DNS—passive	AWS EC2 Akamai VirusTotal Georgia Tech Large U.S. ISP	11/02/2016-02/28/2017 11/10/2016-02/13/2017 05/24/2016-01/30/2017 08/01/2016-02/28/2017 08/01/2016-02/28/2017	141 binaries 293 binaries 594 binaries 290M RRs/day 209M RRs/day
Attack characterization	C2 milkers DDoS IP addresses DDoS IP addresses DDoS IP addresses	Akamai Akamai Google Shield Dyn	09/27/2016-02/28/2017 09/21/2016 09/25/2016 10/21/2016	64.0K attack commands 12.3K IP addresses 158.8K IP addresses 107.5K IP addresses

[Mirai]

Table 1: Data Sources-We utilized a multitude of data perspectives to empirically analyze the Mirai botnet.



- Collaborative mitigation of (IoT-powered) DDoS attacks
- Fingerprinting of DDoS attacks
- Sharing fingerprints and mitigation rules
- More details: antiddoscoalition.nl



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What do you think is the most important challenge for IoT security?

1



Flexible mitigation of IoT-powered DDoS traffic



Developing a DNS security and transparency library for IoT devices

Developing a system to share information on IoT botnets



Key takeaways

- IoT enables smarter, safer, more sustainable society, but extraordinary safety and privacy risks
- The DNS is one of the core components of the Internet infrastructure for traditional applications and will also play a key role for the IoT
- Opportunities to help fulfilling the IoT's new safety and transparency requirements using the DNS' security functions, datasets, and ubiquitous nature
- Poorly developed and maintained IoT devices are a risk in terms of security and DNS usage
- Many challenges for the interaction between the IoT and the DNS, but starting points exist



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Feedback learning objective: to what extent do you think you'll be abl... to discuss different types of IoT security risks (vulnerabilities, attacks) and defense mechanisms to mitigate these risks?



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Feedback wooclap: to what extent do you think wooclap contributed ... the interactivity of the lecture?



Volg ons In SIDN.nl @SIDN In SIDN

Q&A

Next lecture: Wed May 18, 10:45-12:30

Cristian Hesselman Director of SIDN Labs

+31 6 25 07 87 33 c.e.w.hesselman@utwente.nl @hesselma

Elmer Lastdrager Research Engineer +31 6 12 47 84 88 elmer.lastdrager@sidn.nl @ElmerLastdrager

